Conflict, climate and economic shocks weaken agricultural systems in Sahara–Sahel

Agriculture, the economic backbone of the Sahara–Sahelian belt, is operating further from its productive potential than it did just over a decade ago, according to newly published research that traces a region-wide decline in efficiency. The study spans countries from the Atlantic coast to the Mediterranean and finds that ongoing insecurity and systemic shocks have steadily weakened the sector's performance.

Published in the journal Agriculture, the study titled Agricultural Resilience Under Threat: Assessing Technical Efficiency Across Conflict Contexts in the Sahara–Sahelian Region reveals that agricultural technical efficiency has fallen consistently between 2009 and 2021, underscoring the growing vulnerability of food systems in conflict-affected environments.

A region in decline: Measuring the erosion of agricultural efficiency

The research examines 23 countries between 2009 and 2021, a period marked by the rise of extremist violence in the Sahel, the collapse of state authority in parts of Libya, the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad Basin, and overlapping crises such as Ebola and COVID-19. The authors classify countries into three categories: peaceful, post-conflict and conflict-affected, allowing for comparative analysis across different security contexts.

Using national-level data from the United States Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service, based on harmonized FAOSTAT statistics, the study measures technical efficiency as the ability of agricultural systems to maximize output from a given set of inputs. These inputs include land, labor, capital, fertilizer and feed, while output is measured as the gross value of agricultural production in constant 2015 US dollars.

The results show a clear and persistent downward trend. Across the entire region, technical efficiency declined at an average annual rate of about 1.7 percent over the study period. In 2009, most countries were operating relatively close to their estimated production frontier. By 2021, the gap between potential and actual output had widened significantly.

The deterioration was not gradual alone; it was punctuated by sharp drops during key crisis years. Efficiency declined markedly around 2012, coinciding with the escalation of conflict in Mali and the militarization of farmer-herder tensions. Another significant downturn occurred around 2016, when Boko Haram violence reached a peak in northeastern Nigeria and neighboring countries. A further slide between 2019 and 2021 aligned with the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted labor mobility, supply chains and local food markets across the region.

By the end of the study period, agricultural systems were operating far below earlier levels of productive performance. The authors estimate that overall efficiency loss by 2021 represented a substantial decline relative to the starting point in 2009. Statistical tests confirm that the drop in both average efficiency and its overall distribution was significant, underscoring that the decline was not a marginal fluctuation but a systemic shift.

The study finds that traditional efficiency models tend to overstate performance in fragile contexts. By applying a bootstrap correction method, the researchers account for statistical noise and measurement uncertainty. In several cases, countries that initially appeared fully efficient under conventional analysis saw their scores revised downward by as much as 8 to 13 percent after correction. This suggests that headline figures in unstable environments may mask deeper inefficiencies.

Conflict, paradox and uneven resilience across sub-regions

On average, conflict-affected countries recorded slightly higher technical efficiency scores than peaceful and post-conflict countries. Conflict-affected states posted an average efficiency level of 0.875, compared with 0.840 in peaceful countries and 0.833 in post-conflict countries.

At first glance, this appears counterintuitive. However, the authors argue that the pattern reflects geographic heterogeneity and concentration effects. In some conflict-affected countries, major agricultural zones remain productive despite localized violence. Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, contain highly productive regions that offset severe disruptions in specific conflict epicenters, lifting national averages.

Yet the apparent advantage is fragile. All three groups experienced negative annual efficiency growth rates over the period, ranging from minus 1.5 to minus 1.8 percent. Conflict-affected countries also displayed far greater volatility, with sharp swings in performance tied to spikes in violence and displacement. Statistical tests show that differences in average efficiency levels across conflict categories are not significant, reinforcing the conclusion that structural vulnerability cuts across all groups.

Sub-regional analysis reveals deeper contrasts. West Africa recorded the highest mean efficiency level at 0.858, followed closely by North Africa at 0.852, while the Sahel lagged at 0.841. The Sahel also experienced the steepest annual decline, at roughly minus 2.2 percent, nearly double the rate observed in North Africa.

The Sahel's sharper decline reflects what the authors describe as the accumulation of multiple stressors. Chronic insecurity, rapid environmental degradation, weak infrastructure and limited economic diversification combine to strain agricultural systems. In contrast, North African countries, despite facing drought and climate stress, benefit from stronger irrigation networks, better market connectivity and more robust state institutions that help cushion shocks.

At the country level, the disparities are even more pronounced. Burkina Faso and Mali, both heavily affected by sustained armed violence, recorded the steepest declines in efficiency, at minus 4.0 percent and minus 3.5 percent respectively. These declines align with evidence from micro-level studies showing that terrorist violence reduces cultivated land, disrupts labor allocation and cuts investment in inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.

Other countries fared better. Cameroon, Benin, Ghana, Tunisia and Côte d'Ivoire maintained relatively high average efficiency levels throughout the period. Niger and Côte d'Ivoire recorded comparatively modest declines, suggesting that even within fragile regions, security conditions and institutional frameworks play a decisive role in preserving productive capacity.

At the lower end of the spectrum, countries such as The Gambia, Morocco, Sierra Leone and Togo struggled to surpass moderate efficiency thresholds. The Gambia, in particular, stands out as the least technically efficient country in the sample, a finding consistent with previous research pointing to persistent productivity challenges and input-output imbalances.

By 2021, no country in the sample maintained extremely high efficiency levels, and most had shifted into lower performance categories. The spatial spread of declining efficiency mirrors the geography of insecurity across the central Sahel, suggesting a strong association between armed conflict and weakened agricultural robustness.

Beyond war: Climate, health shocks and institutional fragility

The Sahara–Sahelian region faces recurrent droughts, erratic rainfall and progressive land degradation, all of which reduce yields in predominantly rain-fed systems. Climate dependence leaves farmers with narrow margins for adaptation.

Economic and institutional weaknesses compound these environmental risks. Limited access to credit, low technology adoption, weak governance and insufficient public investment constrain farmers' ability to respond to shocks. Regions with stronger financial infrastructure and more stable market institutions demonstrate greater resilience, highlighting the role of economic governance in shaping technical efficiency.

Health crises have added further strain. The Ebola outbreak between 2014 and 2016 disrupted labor availability and agricultural trade in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The COVID-19 pandemic between 2020 and 2021 further disrupted supply chains and market access, exposing the vulnerability of food systems already weakened by conflict and climate stress. The study finds that major health crises align with noticeable deteriorations in efficiency, underscoring the compounding effect of concurrent shocks.

Technical efficiency is treated as a measure of productive robustness, one dimension of broader agricultural resilience. Resilience also includes adaptability and the capacity for transformation, elements not fully captured by efficiency metrics alone. Nonetheless, the steady decline in technical efficiency signals that agricultural systems are struggling to maintain their core output functions under pressure.

Reversing the erosion of agricultural efficiency in the Sahara–Sahel requires more than incremental reform. The study emphasizes that lasting resilience depends first on addressing the root political, social and security drivers of conflict. Without durable peace and inclusive governance, technical interventions will have limited impact.

Targeted agricultural strategies remain vital. The authors point to three strategic priorities: strengthening regional connectivity through trade integration and diversified value chains; investing in education, extension services and managerial capacity to improve farm-level decision-making; and promoting technology transfer and knowledge exchange across countries with different conflict experiences.

Integrated and conflict-sensitive policy frameworks are needed to address the intersection of insecurity, climate change and institutional fragility. Coordinated regional action, backed by stronger institutions and sustainable investment, could help restore productive efficiency and align agricultural systems with broader goals under the Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union's Agenda 2063.