Bangladesh is facing a reckoning: the country has a narrow window to restore the real rule of law

Prosecutors in Bangladesh are now seeking the death penalty for Sheikh Hasina, the country's ousted former Prime Minister, over her role in a crackdown on student-led protests in July 2024. In a moment of significant hyperbole, chief prosecutor Tajul Islam said Hasina deserves 1,400 death sentences. "Since that is not humanly possible, we demand at least one," he declared, underscoring just how far the country's interim government is willing to go after the former administration and anyone remotely associated with it.

The high-profile prosecutions of Hasina, who fled to India following the uprising, and others, come as Bangladesh prepares for general elections in February, amid growing concerns about the direction and the integrity of its ongoing political transition. Hasina's party, the Awami League (AL), has been banned from participating in the vote. A senior researcher noted that if the AL remains banned until the elections, "this would also limit the competitiveness of the electoral process and exclude sympathizers of the AL, who still exist, from meaningful participation in the political process". Meanwhile, the interim government led by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus, installed in the wake of last year's revolution, faces doubts from certain commentators regarding its ability to deliver significant reform or uphold the rule of law.

For a moment, many Bangladeshis believed that July 2024 would serve as a genuine turning point in the country. The student-led revolution, sparked by frustration over civil service quotas and an increase in state violence, forced the resignation of the government. The interim administration was tasked with stabilizing the country, restoring trust, and preparing inclusive elections. Fifteen months later, that early hope is fading.

Factionalism is rising, reform commissions remain toothless, and institutions are still shaped by old loyalties. Among the clearest illustrations of this drift is the increasing politicization of the legal system, where justice has again become a political tool rather than a neutral arbiter.

Just take the recent wave of prosecutions against figures accused of links to the former government. The Alam family, whose business empire under S Alam Group has long played a prominent role in Bangladesh's financial and industrial sectors, has become a case in point. Bangladesh Bank has moved to restructure and merge several banks previously linked to the group, while a Dhaka court has directed authorities to seek Interpol Red Notices against Mohammad Saiful Alam and his brothers, despite shaky evidence. Journalists Farzana Rupa and Shakil Ahmed, meanwhile, remain imprisoned months after Hasina's fall, their bail request denied despite having a small child. Their channel was seen as sympathetic to AL. Together, these cases show how the new authorities risk using the same tools of intimidation and selective prosecution they once denounced. The tools that were meant to restore accountability are now on their way to being repurposed for retribution. There seems to be a dangerous circularity that undermines the very revolution that brought the interim government to power. As the interim government clings to power, international scrutiny is mounting. In recent weeks, European diplomats have increasingly raised concerns in public and in private about the rule of law issues deeply entrenched within Bangladesh's interim government. The Ambassadors of Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands met with senior AL figures to push for greater transparency and reconciliation, while British lawmakers have joined calls for Bangladesh to restore the rule of law and ensure broad political participation ahead of the elections, urging a "clear and time-bound pathway towards peaceful elections and the establishment of a stable civilian government."

This is not what the revolution was meant to deliver: Bangladeshis were hoping that the transitional government would enact sensible reforms and prepare for credible elections. Commissions were formed to review the constitution, strengthen judicial independence, and address corruption, while international observers were invited to lend legitimacy. But nearly a year on, not a single commission recommendation has been formally adopted. Key appointments remain politicised; reform momentum is stalling, all while trust in the government's neutrality is eroding.

At the heart of this failure lies a deeper problem. Bangladesh's legal architecture remains vulnerable to political capture. Courts, prosecutors, and regulators are still aligned with whichever faction is dominant. Legal instruments ranging from tax audits to arrest warrants are again being used not to uphold justice, but to punish dissent or settle scores. The result is something worse than a rule-of-law vacuum: a rule-of-law distortion, where due process is selectively applied and rights are conditional.

The reforms that Bangladesh needs will not succeed unless this dynamic is broken. The country cannot build a future by replicating the injustices of its past. Progress can only be made when justice ceases to be a weapon and once again becomes a safeguard. Bangladesh would do well to capitalize on this moment, not to pursue past grievances but to rebuild credibility and trust, both at home and abroad. The revolution's promise was to end cycles of repression, not to repeat them. What is at stake for Bangladesh is not just reputational damage or business continuity. It is the steady erosion of legal certainty, the idea that citizens can act within a known set of rules and expect fair treatment regardless of political affiliation. Without this, investment dries up, trust collapses, and reform withers. This interim government must decide what kind of legacy it wants to leave. Cosmetic changes will not convince a constituency that risked everything in July 2024. Nor will they satisfy international partners, who are watching closely. What is needed is institutional courage: an end to politically motivated prosecutions and the establishment of independent mechanisms capable of investigating state overreach.

This means shielding judges and regulators from political interference. And most urgently, it means restoring the independence of the Anti-Corruption Commission and Public Service Commission—two institutions which have become lightning rods for political abuse.

Bangladesh is not without tools. The country ratified the UN Convention against Corruption and is a party to multiple regional mechanisms for judicial cooperation. It has the legal framework needed to clean things up; what it lacks is the political will to apply this framework impartially.

A modern rule-of-law system must rest on institutions, transparency, and accountability. The July 2024 revolution opened a window, but the faltering steps of the interim government mean that that window is closing quickly. If real reform is not enacted soon, the country risks relapse into the very dysfunction it sought to escape.

(Disclaimer: Devdiscourse's journalists were not involved in the production of this article. The facts and opinions appearing in the article do not reflect the views of Devdiscourse and Devdiscourse does not claim any responsibility for the same.)